ernment policy. Situations like these are what interested me in the topic of national identity. Are the French's patriotic views genuine or are they used as excuses for why they oppose or support certain issues? Furthermore, does pride need to be considered when evaluating one's national identity relating to their attitudes towards European integration? These are some of the questions I will attempt to address in my study of France.
On the other hand, exclusivist national identity concerns are infamous for playing a role in one's attitudes for or against the European Union. These concerns have become increasingly important in France due to issues of economics and especially immigration.
As recently as last November, the government of the conservative president Nicolas Sarkozy launched the "great debate on the national identity," which critics have accused of fostering fear of French citizens with foreign roots and immigrants. The initiative intends to be a national consultation on defining the French identity through local meetings and a website where people can express their opinions. Although the government views this debate positively, national polls recorded that 50% of French citizens are dissatisfied with the way this debate is proceeding in France (Vision Critical, 2010) .
This high percentage of dissatisfaction demonstrates the need for further evaluation of French citizens' exclusivist concerns. If one can find that there is a correlation between an individual's exclusivist national identity and support for EU integration, it can help address reasons why so many citizens oppose this debate. Furthermore, if a correlation is found, these findings will better aide in a search for why one supports or opposes the European Union.
With regards to exclusivist ideals, economic concerns are imperative to address. In the past, economics have been considered the reason for certain citizen's attitudes for or against European Union integration. These concerns are regarded as external factors that influence the public's decision. Within economics, there are two categories that I will discuss-sociotropic and pocketbook concerns. Sociotropic concerns are associated with the idea that one considers economics collectively; for instance, a person would consider the overall economic approval of France. On the other hand, pocketbook concerns deal with how an individual evaluates his economic approval without taking into consideration other's situations. If any correlation is found between one's economic concerns and one's attitude towards the EU, it can help theorists to further understand why citizens feel certain ways. If these questions can be further addressed, it can help further European integration because the EU would be better able to appeal to certain citizens' interests.
As previously stated, a factor that one needs to consider when discussing EU integration is economic concerns. This part of society plays a very large role when discussing whether citizens are for or against integration. Brinegar and Jolly (2005) demonstrate very interesting points in their article, Support for European Integration: Location, Location, Location. They find that low-skilled workers in economies with a lot of low-skilled labor are likely to welcome European integration, whereas low-skilled citizens in countries with a scarcity of low-skilled labor are likely to have a more negative evaluation of the EU (Brinegar & Jolly, 2005) . This makes sense because EU integration with enlargement would only increase the competition for jobs in that field by simply the increase in population-more people competing for the same jobs. That is why it is easier to be against integration to protect one's job market, thus having an exclusivist position. On the other hand, though there are exceptions, professionals and executives are more likely to support European integration than manual laborers (Brinegar & Jolly, 2005) . These findings correspond with the previous statement. As EU enlargement and integration continues, it seems to be a trend that there are more immigrants needing manual jobs than professional ones, which is why the executives would be in favor of this concept because it doesn't affect them.
Gabel (1998) does a fine job complementing Brinegar and Jolly's article in his book, Interests and Integration Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union. He further emphasizes how for unskilled workers, market liberalization creates competitiveness on wages while skilled workers with relatively high levels of human capital derive greater benefits from integration than those with relatively low levels of human capital (Gabel, 1998) . This is a crucial point when discussing European integration; integration leads to market liberalization, which feeds competiveness for the unskilled workers of the country. He also argues that the benefits of trade liberalization increase with the dependence of the national economy on exports and imports from the EU market (Gabel, 1998) . Therefore, the country has to give up some of its national economy to gain from the collective good, the European Union. This statement further proves why economic concerns are essential when discussing national identity and further EU integration.
However, in a very shocking article by Gross (1999) , Three Million Foreigners, Three Million Unemployed? Immigration and the French Labor Market, she found that immigration flows couldn't be held responsible for the substantial increase in unemployment in France. Though there are certain factors that increase unemployment temporarily, the long-term effects were not disrupted. Gross (1999) states:
Low-skilled workers are beneficial to the French labor market. Their positive influence is also confirmed by the direct importance of a balanced distribution of regions of origin for unemployment. A rising flow of immigrant workers increases the aggregate wage, which feeds into unemployment, leading to a temporary increase in unemployment (p. 23). Although Gross's study finds that the effects of immigration on the French labor market are very small, temporary, and not specific to the foreign labor force, it is necessary to pay extra attention to the temporary causes. A significant issue with EU integration is that many citizens do not realize that these situations are only temporary, which leads to their exclusivist reasons to oppose EU integration.
Another exclusivist ideal that complements economic concerns is the threat of immigration. With regards to the current times, it is essential to consider immigration when discussing the reasons why people support or oppose European Union integration. Furthermore, due to the recent problems France has experienced with immigrants, it is even more significant to consider immigration with the case study that I have chosen. The presence of immigrants can evidentially influence one's attitude towards integration due to one's personal experiences regarding his interactions with the new civilians. Also, it is important to address how the presence of immigrants can give more attention to the inside versus outside paradigm.
In the book Immigration, 'race' and ethnicity in contemporary France, by Alec G. Hargreaves (1995) , he argues how there are no "races" in France amongst whom "relations" can be said to exist. He continues to talk about how there is confusion between the definitions of an immigrant and a foreigner. Also, it is addressed how immigrant-born youths should be considered equal when being compared to their French peers due to the education system. Silverman (1992) continues to say in his book, Deconstructing the nation: immigration, racism, and citizenship in modern France, how 80% of those popularly classified as immigrants have been in France for more than ten years. He further addresses how the major classification of people in France is in terms of nationality: you are either a national or a foreigner (Silverman, 1992) . This is the issue that I firmly think is problematic when discussing European integration, especially when regarding the case study of France.
The last concern that needs to be addressed concerning exclusivist ideals is the idea of national identity. It is essential to concentrate on the difference between exclusive and inclusive identity because identity cannot be generalized-the different identities are associated with different motives. If these motives are found to be correlated with support or opposition towards EU integration, they will serve as a technique to further help one understand why citizens possess certain attitudes. Once these reasons are found to be significant, problem solving can commence to close the distance gap between the European Union and its citizens.
Cederman (2001) There are different views such as the essentialist approach (each ethnic core produces a political identity more or less straightforwardly) and the constructivism approach (the unmitigated link between cultural raw material and political identities is broken by an active process of identity-formation entailing manipulation of cultural symbols) when evaluating integration. Furthermore, there is a difference between supersession (the nation-state is superseded as soon as a supra-national system of symbols is established and is adhered to by the masses) and retention (of national identity to denote assumptions that stress the staying power of actually existing nation-states together with their supporting principle, nationalism) when demonstrating ways to evaluate the nation-state compared to the supra-national system (p.142-144).
He argues that bounded-integration is the most convincing through the associative, electoral, and civic channels. When bounded integrationists want autonomy protection it simply means that the integration process must be slowed down in order for identity-formation to catch up (Cederman, 2001) . He addresses national identity as a factor that needs to be considered when discussing EU integration, but further evaluates how one should utilize this concept.
Moreover, Adebahr (2009) in Think National Interest, Act European believes that integration is the only way forward for the EU. He believes that specific global challenges such as the economic crisis and climate change have become the driving forces of European integration. He states, "It is no longer the possibility of integration based on its inherent advantages that are in the foreground, but rather the necessity of defending ourselves against increasing dangers (Adebahr, 2009) ." Therefore, this is a different way to look at integration; by integrating the EU, the EU as a whole can be protected from others-such as other countries outside of Europe. This is not a view of the EU being exclusivist among each other, but joining together to be exclusivist to other countries outside of its borders. This approach to EU integration could raise many questions concerning one's national identity, which requires further research.
When discussing European integration, it is essential to discuss Hooghe's stance on the issue. In Hooghe's (2003) article, Europe Divided? Elites vs. Public Opinion on European Integration, she discusses the difference between the functional model and the social model. The functional model argues that elites and citizens desire Europeanization if and when it is functional, while the social model says that since there might be some risk involved in keeping certain issues at the national level, citizens may want to selectively shift some policies to the European level (Hooghe, 2003) . Within her study, she compares the opinions of others in certain areas such as high politics issues, social model policies, and redistribution. Her study finds that there is a divide between elite support for integration and public opinion; elites tend to embody the functional model while citizens tend to embody the social model.
With regards to the previous concepts stated, inclusive concerns (pride) and exclusive concerns (immigration and economic reasons), these issues can help the European Union with addressing integration to its citizens through the inside versus outside paradigm. This is specifically important with the country of France due to its stereotypical attitudes that its citizens are known for-nationalistic attitudes. These attitudes are associated with French citizens' civic identity. By addressing the difference between inclusive and exclusive ideals concerning one's national identity, it will further provide more solutions for citizens' attitudes and help to narrow the gap between the European Union and its citizens when discussing EU integration.
THEORY
The relationship between France and national identity is a very important issue to address concerning European integration. Especially regarding France, the concept of civic identity is extremely significant when discussing citizens' stance on national identity. This is evident as seen with the protests and referendums; public opinion on integration is very vital to this country. It is not clear what aspects of national identity contribute to attitudes toward EU integration. This is why one needs to take a deeper look into the concept of identity.
French citizens have always possessed an attachment to their country. Whether it is concerning one's pride or one's idea of protection, they have always been known for their nationalistic traits. The necessary question to address is why these citizens possess this idea of national identity. I think one needs to evaluate the situation deeper by looking at the differences between exclusive and inclusive identity. This would allow for a better understanding of EU support. Concerning identity, is it a correlation with pride or an exclusivist outcome? France is a different case with these two concepts. Pride may not predict low support; it may be exclusivist intentions. Although this may be the case, I believe a French citizen doesn't need to have an exclusivist identity; this is why the French should not necessarily possess anti-European Union ideals. Discussing the reasons why I think that it is important to evaluate one's national identity led me to my research question and hypotheses. In France, does national identity affect one's opinion on EU integration? If so, what is the role of exclusive and inclusive positions of national identity?
H1: High levels of exclusivist national identity will relate to low levels of support for EU integration.
H2: There will be no relationship between national pride and European Union support.
H3: High levels of economic support will equal low levels of EU support.

METHOD
A snowball sample of 116 French citizens was used. People were contacted in November 2010 through email using the online survey tool, Qualtrics, and invited to participate in the questionnaire that took about 10 minutes.
The steps taken to complete the survey were the following: First, numerous pieces of literature were read concerning the main variables. The variables were determined as: the dependent variable being support for European Union integration, while the independent variable was national identity-exclusive (immigration and economic concerns) and inclusive (pride). Further literature was studied with regards to the United States' national identity concerning African Americans. A parallel was found with the research of America to the research of Europe. After the literature was read, the survey was produced concerning questions that were deemed necessary to address. Some of the questions were adopted from Professor Basak Ural's survey regarding the case study of Germany. Further questions were created that appealed specifically to the French citizens' interests. Once all the questions were formed, they were categorized into sections that corresponded with the variables previously stated. Furthermore, decisions were made whether the questions were considered inclusive or exclusive concerns, which would help once the data was collected.
An introductory page was added to explain how the participants would be kept anonymous and an email address was provided if they had any further questions. The entire survey was then translated into French and proofread by Professor Brett Wells, Program Chairman of the French Department at the University of Pittsburgh. The survey was distributed through a link provided by Qualtrics and sent out by email to numerous French citizens: host families, academic advisors, personal friends, hotel owners, restaurant staff, Honorary French Consuls throughout states in America, and the University of Pittsburgh's French Department. The participants were given two weeks to complete the survey and the data was collected through Qualtrics.
Once all the data was collected, it was imported into Excel and each participant's response was coded. The data was then categorized by questions, which were determined by the variables. Scales were created for each category and certain questions were reversed if needed to follow the same scale as the rest of the questions. The scales were then used to find correlations through Excel with each variable. Correlations were found using the dependent variable (EU Support for Integration) and different independent variables (exclusive ideals, inclusive ideals, economic concerns, and immigration) for each correlation. To specify certain questions, cross tabulations were conducted using Qualtrics to see if they could better provide results regarding certain questions. The following are the questions that were considered for each scale (See Appendix A).
The sex of the participants was 33.7% males and 66.3% females; the females were overrepresented with regards to France. The age of the participants ranged from 17 to 73 years (M=44.8 years, Standard Deviation=15.14). Concerning education, an overwhelming majority of the participants completed the BAC. More specifically, the percentages were as followed for the highest level of education: BAC (11%), BAC +1, 2, 3 (41%), BAC +4, 5, 6 (37%), BAC +7, 8, 9, 10 (7%), and other (4%). The average monthly net household income ranged from less than 300 Euros to more than 5,000 Euros (M=7.18, 7=2,000-3,000 Euros on the scale, with a Standard Deviation= 2.40). Concerning one's civil status: 29% were single, 52% were married, 7% were living together, and 12% did not respond. With regards to the number of children: 38% had zero children, 5%, had one child, 8% had two, 20% had three, 19% had four, 9% had five, and 1% had six children. The participants' level of work varied by: 16% were students, 19% were retired, 51% were employed, and 16% were unemployed. The majority of French citizens lived in France (93%) while 4% lived in the United States, and 3% lived elsewhere. More specifically, 55% of the participants lived in Nantes, 9% lived in Paris, 3% lived in Marseilles, and 3% lived in Pittsburgh. The rest of the participants lived all over France and cities such as: Madrid, England, and Sydney.
MATERIAL
Participants completed a questionnaire on: (a) general interests in politics (5 items), (b) knowledge of political institutions (2 items), (c) national identity concerning exclusivist ideals (7 items), (d) national identity concerning inclusive ideals (7 items), (e) stance on immigration (7 items), (f) stance on power with nation state or EU (4 items), (g) economic concerns (4 items), and (h) demographics (9 items). Questions were presented as Likert-type or bipolar scales with three to eleven responses. The scales of measurement were mostly adopted from Professor Basak Ural's study. Due to some of her questions regarding only Germany, other items were added concerning French ideals to receive more specific results. The complete questionnaire with average answers and standard deviations is given in Appendix A.
RESULTS
Before stating the results for each hypothesis, it is necessary to focus on the general findings for France with regards to the survey so that one can have a better understanding of the case study before the specific results are addressed. For instance, regarding the left/right political spectrum, the M=4.47 and SD=1.45 with the scale being 1=very left and 7=very right, showing that the participants were further right than left, which is typical for France when comparing it to other countries. Moreover, there was a general shift to the right with elections concerning how citizens will vote for the next elections. The mean shifted by .15 to the right with regards to the political parties they would vote for next time. There was even an increase of 5 citizens who would vote for the Front National, which is the most extreme right political party in France. Concerning one's knowledge, the mean increased by 1.47 on a scale of 1-10 (1=knowing nothing and 10=knowing the most), regarding how much French citizens think they know about France's government compared to the European Union. This was also a typical assumption by nation state's knowing more about their government than that of the European Union.
H1: High levels of exclusivist national identity will relate to low levels of support for EU integration.
In other words, as exclusivist national identity increases, support for EU integration will decrease. In general, 68% said France joining the EU was a good thing but only 53% thought that France benefitted from the EU. Also, when asking the question, "In the future, do you see yourself as…," 72% said that they are French first and European second. Most importantly, it was found that as disapproval for the EU increases, exclusivist ideals increase, r=.50. This is a very strong correlation, which supports hypothesis 1. This correlation demonstrates how exclusivist concerns affect one's attitude towards EU integration. Due to these findings concerning national identity and support for EU integration, it is necessary to take a deeper look to find out the reasons why the citizens felt this way regarding the previous findings.
The first aspect of exclusive identity that needs to be addressed is the concern for immigration and how certain concerns affect one's attitude towards EU integration. This is an essential concept to evaluate because 99% of the participants believe immigration is a current, important question in France. When asking the question, "Think of the immigrants currently living in France. What is the percentage you believe they are willing to assimilate into French society?" the M=5.81 (0%=1 and 100%=11) and the SD=2.28. The average that French citizens believe immigrants will assimilate is only 48% into French life. Furthermore, the majority of respondents believe immigrants will only assimilate 30%. With regards to the average of citizens believing immigrant assimilation is less than 50%, this idea can potentially serve as a reason why exclusivist ideals coincide with one's attitude involving EU integration. French citizens could oppose EU integration because they believe immigrants will not fully assimilate into their culture.
This point is further emphasized when discussing the correlations found between support for the EU and immigration. It was found that as disapproval for the EU increases, disapproval for immigration increases, r=.45. This is considered a quite strong correlation and can show the relationship between the two variables. This correlation supports hypothesis 1 because immigration is an example of an exclusive concern. Therefore, immigration may serve as a reason why one supports or opposes EU integration.
Furthermore, it is crucial to differentiate between French citizens' attitudes regarding immigration between EU and non-EU countries. Concerning the questions in the survey, the participants were more in favor for EU immigration than non-EU immigration. With the scale being 1=very favorable and 5=not favorable, the M=3.27 and SD=1.07 for non-EU, and M=2.56 and SD=.89 for EU countries; there is a .71 increase of the mean towards being against immigration when discussing non-EU countries compared to EU countries. To facilitate the understanding of these results, reference the cross tabulations: Integration Scale/Non-EU Immigration and Integration Scale/EU Immigration (See Appendix B).
Concerning these tables, one can see that as support for EU integration increases, support for immigration increases in general. With regards to non-EU countries, there is a decrease with support, which explains France's attitudes towards non-EU immigration. For instance, there was a general shift towards being against non-EU immigration with regards to people who were for integration. This provides a more detailed explanation regarding French citizens' reasons for opposing EU integration with the exclusivist concepts of immigration. These findings show that by holding attitudes of EU integration constant, citizens are more willing to support immigration if the immigrants are already in the European Union.
With reference to the Hooghe questions that were asked in the survey concerning the distribution of power between the nation-state and EU (1= national only/5= EU only), the findings were very neutral regarding the citizens viewing the EU exclusively. In the survey, one concept was adopted from each of her areas: high politic issues (currency), social model policies (environment), and redistribution (agriculture). With regards to the scale, M=3.3 and SD=.88 for currency, M=3.23 and SD=.88 for environment, and M=2.8 and SD=1.01 for agriculture. Agriculture is the only area where the mean leans slightly more towards France's power, which makes sense concerning the history of France and its agriculture; they would like their nation-state to have a little more control than the supranational organization. Due to the other two issues being generally neutral or even slightly towards EU power only, it is important to address that power over these areas does not greatly influence one's reasons why they support or oppose EU integration.
H2: There will be no relationship between national pride and European Union support.
Through the results of the study, this hypothesis is proven to be inaccurate. The correlation found was that as disapproval for the EU increases, one's pride increases, r=.427. Therefore, citizen's inclusive concerns (such as pride) need to be taken into consideration when discussing the reasons for one's attitude towards EU integration. Even though this is shown through the correlation, it is important to address this relationship but state that exclusive concerns are still stronger when evaluating citizens' attitudes (remembering that r=.50 when discussing the correlation between exclusive ideals and support for the EU). In general, 74% considered them proud to be French, while 26% either did not care or were not proud to be a French citizen. When considering the case study of France, this is an interesting find because past literature has shown that it is typical for an overwhelming majority of French citizens to be proud of their country. It was shocking to find that over ¼ of the citizens did not hold this assumption true.
Furthermore, when discussing specific questions regarding one's pride, it is interesting to note how one's attitude towards pride differs concerning what aspect of the concept is being asked. Questions 16, 17, and 18 were evaluated on a scale of 5 (See Appendix A). When discussing the heritage of France, results showed that M=4.8 and SD=.53, which demonstrates a really strong agreement with the affirmation. Therefore, the French believe they have a very strong history. When discussing French attributes, M=3.96 and SD=1.05, the average also strongly agrees that they possess certain characteristics that others do not. By believing they possess these attributes, the French are simply more proud to be French. Lastly, M=3.17 and SD=1.20 for France's national anthem; this shows that the French were quite indifferent with regards to their pride being correlated when hearing the anthem. By discussing the means of these specific questions show how the French differentiate when discussing what aspects of France make them proud, which could serve as a potential problem when correlating support for EU integration with France's inclusive concerns (pride).
With regards to this potential problem, it is necessary to take a deeper look into certain scales of integration concerning different pride statements used in the survey. The cross tabulations will help to clarify how strongly pride actually has an effect on one's attitude towards EU integration. Reference the following cross tabulations: For/against integration: Pride Statement, Scale of integration/Proud Statement, Identity/ Integration Scale (See Appendix B).
It is important to address that although r=.42 regarding pride and support for EU integration, there are specific instances where pride shows no significant relation with how one feels about integration. For example, looking at the cross tabulation (For/against Integration: Pride Scale), 67/108 citizens who said they were proud also said they were for integration. Also, all the people who said they were "neither" concerning pride was still for EU integration, 22/108. Furthermore, the only people who said they were only a little proud or not proud at all were still for integration 5/108. Although there is a correlation between pride and EU support, this example shows that pride did not greatly factor into one's decision on EU integration due to how widely the results for pride varied yet support for EU integration was constant.
When referencing the cross tabulation (Scale of Integration/Proud Statement), it is interesting to note that 92/108 citizens that entirely agree with their proud history vary on their views of EU integration with a M=5.67. Although there is a strong correlation that I cannot dismiss, while pride was constant, one's attitude towards EU integration varied, which shows that pride did not factor into this situation. Lastly, when looking at the cross tabulation (Identity/Integration Scale), the majority of citizens who said they were French first then European were still for integration, 68/108 citizens. Therefore, in this situation, the pride of being French did not make one oppose integration. It needs to be addressed that this identity questioned was also discussed in the exclusive national identity section but was not involved in any correlations due to the question applying to both inclusive and exclusive ideals.
H3: High levels of economic support will equal low levels of EU support.
In other words, as economic approval increases, EU support for integration decreases. The correlation found that as disapproval for EU increases, economic disapproval increases, r=.05. Though this is considered a correlation, it is a very weak relationship. Also, this correlation finds my hypothesis to be inaccurate because as economic disapproval increases, approval for the EU should have increased, not decreased. Due to the small correlation of opposite findings, it is necessary to see if there is a difference when correlating sociotropic and pocketbook concerns with support for EU integration. General findings showed that 48% less citizens said their personal economics were bad compared to France's overall economics. No one believed that France's economics were considered very good. Also, there was a 13% increase when saying France's economic situation will get worse compared to one's individual situation (both of these findings can be shown in the first two cross tabulations). Though the correlations did not support a clearer explanation (sociotropic concerns, r=.04 and pocketbook concerns, r=.06), they showed how it was necessary to conduct cross tabulations for further explanations of the overall small correlation. Reference the following cross tabulations: France's Pocketbook Concerns, France's Sociotropic Concerns, Pocketbook Concerns/Integration, Sociotropic Concerns/Integration (See Appendix B).
Concerning France's pocketbook and integration cross tabulation, for the majority, high and low levels of economic concern led to high EU support for integration. On the other hand, France's sociotropic and integration cross tabulation shows that low levels of economic support led to high levels of EU support for integration. Therefore, with regards to sociotropic concerns, hypothesis 3 is considered correct. Due to these cross tabulations, they provide a potential explanation that the difference between pocketbook and sociotropic concerns could explain the low and opposite findings for the correlation.
It is also important to note that the previous findings were retrospective. Therefore, it is necessary to see if one's prospective views of pocketbook and sociotropic concerns show any difference to one's attitude towards EU integration. Reference the following cross tabulations for a further explanation: Pocketbook/Integration-Prospective and Sociotropic/ Integration-Prospective (See Appendix B).
With regards to the prospective cross tabulations, citizens who were for integration showed a shift towards the idea that France will do worse in a year than citizen's individual situations. These results coincide with the general findings previously stated. I believe it is necessary to address that as the research progressed, pocketbook concerns served as only a comparison to show the sociotropic concerns in relative terms. When comparing the prospective cross tabulations with the retrospective ones, the prospective tables can further help with hypothesis 3 concerning sociotropic concerns. The shift showing how citizens think France will do worse demonstrates that low levels of economic approval equal high levels of EU support. This finding complements the retrospective, sociotropic results very well. By showing that the retrospective and prospective results concerning sociotropic concerns show the same findings, demonstrates how the time of economics do not factor into one's attitudes towards EU integration.
DISCUSSION
Though the results of my survey did not necessarily support each one of the hypotheses, it provided for a better understanding of French citizens regarding their attitudes towards EU integration. Also, it allowed for new findings to be discussed without initially contemplating them prior to the survey. Furthermore, the research offered a better explanation of the previous authors' stances on the issue of EU integration. Through the results, citizens' incentives to support or oppose the European Union have been clarified through inclusive and exclusive concerns of national identity.
With regards to hypothesis 1, the correlation showed that as disapproval for the EU increases, exclusivist ideals increase, r=.50. Moreover, as disapproval for EU increases, disapproval for immigration increases, r=.45. When specifically looking at two survey items, the shift for not being in favor of immigration when it is with a non-EU country shows how citizens are more willing to support immigration if immigrants are already in the EU-these results consisted of people who initially stated that they supported integration. This exemplifies that it needs to be taken into consideration what country the immigrants are coming from when discussing immigration and integration. To further establish this point, one respondent emailed me to ask for clarification concerning the countries being considered. He stated that if the survey was considering Turkey, his results would have been different. The empirical evidence and correlations suggest that exclusivist concerns and immigration matter, and they should be taken into consideration when discussing countries outside of the EU.
Other findings that I deem significant to address are the results concerning Hooghe's (2003) stances on the divide of power between the nation-state and the EU. As previously stated, due to Hooghe's questions in the survey mostly being neutral or slightly towards EU power, (with the exception of agriculture) demonstrate that power does not significantly factor into one's reasons for why he supports or opposes the EU. This is interesting when discussing France due to numerous authors' literature stating how France would oppose the EU due to losing power to the supranational organization.
After evaluating my results, certain issues arose with how I could have constructed my survey differently or what I will add to continue my research in the future. Regarding the French citizen who established his concern for countries like Turkey, I believe there needs to be more research regarding certain countries of debate to see if they have a stronger correlation than immigration in general. Therefore, more questions need to be asked about different non-EU countries. Although the correlation between exclusivist concerns and support for EU integration was strong, it was difficult to find a cross tabulation that showed a strong relationship between an exclusive and integration question. In the future, it would be helpful to ask more exclusive questions to have a larger option to choose from. Most importantly, it is necessary to address that the results of this survey may be skewed due to the participants knowing that they were completing it for an American citizen.
Due to both of the correlations being strong with this hypothesis, it shows that exclusive concerns are significant. With regards to these results, if more research was conducted concerning Cederman's (2001) bounded integrationist concept, this idea could be demonstrated as a possible solution for why people oppose EU integration. Since the research shows that exclusive national identity is important and the concept is about slowing down the integration process so national identity can catch up, bounded integration could provide a rational compromise for exclusive concerns and EU integration. Furthermore, Silverman's (1992) idea of being either a national or a foreigner is further demonstrated in the cross tabulation of EU and non-EU countries concerning immigration. The more one is considered a foreigner, the less likely French citizens are willing to permit immigration. Further research would allow for more detailed findings of the previous statements.
When discussing hypothesis 2, the correlation found that as disapproval for the EU increase, one's pride increases, r=.427. Although this is considered a strong correlation, the specific questions in the survey demonstrated how people's pride changed due to the different questions being asked. The three cross tabulations in this section revealed the inconsistency of how one perceives the concept of pride. For instance, the first cross tabulation showed how pride varied when support for integration was constant, while the second one showed how one's opinion on integration varied when pride was constant. These findings can show how even though the correlation was considered strong, the concept of pride varied due to how the citizen defined pride.
Even though this hypothesis was shown to be inaccurate, many findings show that pride is a difficult concept to evaluate. Since pride is considered subjective, in future surveys, the definition of pride needs to be established before the participants can answer the questions. In addition, it would be helpful to differentiate the inclusive concerns regarding nationalism and patriotism. The examples of specific questions, descriptive analysis and cross tabulations, show how pride can vary depending on the participant. Pride was found to be a "case-bycase" concept so that the meaning is different for different people. With subjectivity aside, it was shown that pride does factor into one's attitude towards the EU due to the correlation. This finding could be considered a potential reason why President Chirac walked out of the summit; he was simply too proud of his language to even consider listening to a different one.
Lastly, the correlation found regarding hypothesis 3 states that as disapproval for the EU increases, economic disapproval increases, r=.05. Regarding the retrospective cross tabulations, the pocketbook table showed that high and low levels of economic concern led to high levels of EU support, while the sociotropic table showed that low levels of economic support led to high levels of EU support. On the other hand, regarding the prospective cross tabulations, the sociotropic table demonstrated how there was a shift towards thinking that France will do worse in a year than one's individual situation. This finding complements the retrospective cross tabulation concerning France's sociotropic concerns. While they complement one another, it also expresses that it does not matter when one views the economics because both cross tabulations concerning the sociotropic concerns support hypothesis 3.
In relation to the findings stated above, there is a difference with one's view on pocketbook and sociotropic concerns; this needs to be considered for the explanation of the low, opposite correlation. To prove this finding conclusively, one would need to ask more questions differentiating between pocketbook and sociotropic economic concerns. Furthermore, asking more questions could be a method to find a stronger correlation since the correlation was only based on four questions concerning economics in the survey. One possible explanation for why the correlation was found to be small and opposite of the hypothesis is the explanation of French citizens' view on immigrants and the economy. Gross (1999) states that there is a temporary increase in unemployment because of immigrants. This statement complements my correlation very well; as disapproval for the EU increases (with regards to immigrants), economic disapproval increases (concerning the temporary unemployment). This is a potential explanation that requires further research for future studies.
Throughout all of the results found through correlations and cross tabulations with regards to the study, one's national identity does have an effect on one's attitude towards EU integration. Considering the research that was conducted, a possible solution could be that a combination of inclusive and exclusive identity needs to be considered when discussing one's motives for one's attitudes. It is noted, however, with the correlations that exclusivist ideals play a larger role with regards to support towards the European Union. Furthermore, if people conduct a study that defines pride, I believe the correlation would be stronger with regards to how the inclusive identity affects an individual's reasons for supporting or opposing the EU. Lastly, if one could further research the differences between pocketbook and sociotropic concerns, I think there would be a stronger correlation regarding disapproval for the EU and economic disapproval. With the exception of economics, it is shown throughout the study that exclusive concerns play a significant role concerning one's attitudes towards EU integration, while pride is considered a close second. Through more surveys of public opinion, I believe it would be achievable to prove that exclusive and inclusive concerns of national identity complement one another when discussing one's attitude towards European Union integration. 
